Abstract-Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) has been a technological approach that has received considerable research attention over the past decade. At the same time, the relative paucity of deployed systems using some of these technologies speaks to either a mismatch between research priorities and practical needs, regulatory immaturity, technology immaturity, or a combination of these. In this paper, we examine the business decision that a spectrum entrant must take with regard to technology choice. We use a simple decision-analytic framework using standard Net Present Value (NPV) calculations to analyze that decision. Our conclusion is that, the spectrum decision is time dependent. Exclusive use offers a higher NPV than the alternatives in the long run, but it takes time for exclusive use to become the dominant choice. Cooperative sharing provides the second highest NPV when the spectrum market is liquid, followed by opportunistic sharing under optimistic spectrum availability and contention assumptions.
INTRODUCTION
At the 5 th IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN) in 2011, an undertone of the meeting was that academic research was irrelevant in practice. This did not show up in the papers in the published conference proceedings, but was clear in the questions and in the hallway conversations. Summarizing the main elements of the argument:
• after about a decade of research in DSA technologies, there has been little to show for the effort in the way of practical systems; and
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• academic research has not been paying attention to priorities for commercial implementation.
While these criticisms surely have some merit, there have been some notable contributions to this end (see, for example, [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] ).
In this paper, we do not seek to debate these observations, but rather to gain insight into the barriers to adoption of DSA techniques and technologies.
In its simplest form, spectrum sharing involves providing spectrum access opportunities to market or industry entrants whose application is best met by wireless systems. Spectrum access opportunities occur because license holders (i.e., spectrum incumbents) do not utilize their spectrum 100% of the time. Sharing can occur through cooperatively (i.e., through explicit bargaining) or opportunistically (i.e., without bargaining).
To address the criticisms described above means, in part, exploring the conditions under which DSA might be adopted. To do this, we must examine the incentives and constraints of both primary and secondary users. The incentives that primary users have for sharing have been studied (see [5] and others), though these studies often do not consider the business strategies, investment and technological risks that primary users face. Similarly, the decision processes of potential secondary users must be studied to understand the circumstances under which they adopt this technology. The choices confronted by potential secondary users in context has received little attention beyond the work of Tonmukayakul and Weiss [1] and Weiss [2] .
We refer to potential secondary users in context because entrants have a range of choices they can make. In the simplest form (used by [1] ) the entrant can choose to obtain a license, to use license-free spectrum or to use a secondary use technology. Within the domain of secondary use, they have a range of choices available (outlined very briefly above but described in more detail by [4] . Each of these choices carries risks, such as investment risks, technological risks, service risks, strategic risks as well as benefits, such as return on investment, Quality of Services (QoS) premiums, etc.
In this paper, we will build a first order model of the secondary user's decision across these choices, accounting in a simple way for these risks. Since the range of choices is large and highly context dependent we will focus only on spectrum entrants who intend to operate a direct infrastructure-based 978-1-4673-4448-7/12/$31.00 ©2012 IEEE 2012 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks system in one of four ways (outlined below). In doing so, we do not include MVNO relationships, or the kinds of spectrum access that might occur under virtualized mobile networks [6] . We use Net Present Value (NPV) to demonstrate the investment and return for each spectrum choice, and summarize the preferred situations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II elaborates an entrant's spectrum choices and investment and revenue for each choice.. Section III computes the NPV for each choice based on a set of cost assumptions as well as a comparison of the choices. Section IV examines the risks and potential management flexibility for each spectrum choice. Section V provides two case studies for the decision analysis. Section VI summarizes the paper and proposes future research.
II. SPECTRUM CHOICES
In our simplified choice regime, we model an infrastructure-based spectrum entrant who is confronted with four alternatives (summarized in Figure 1 ) -exclusive use, cooperative sharing, opportunistic sharing, and unlicensed usage. The spectrum entrant must make an irrevocable choice of one of these four approaches to provide a wireless service (this assumption will be discussed in IV in detail). We assume that the revenue that the entrant can obtain is not dependent on the approach that is chosen, but, for simplicity, is linearly dependent on the service quality s/he can achieve, the number of users reached, and the period of time that these can be reached. For simplicity, we assume the revenue is certain in all scenarios. Before we delve into the details of the analysis, it is useful to consider these alternatives qualitatively (from [2] ). 
A. Four infrastructure-based spectrum choices
Exclusive use requires that the entrant obtains a spectrum license via primary or secondary markets [7] . This gives the entrant optimal opportunity to engineer its systems to a desired quality level without involving other parties. The spectrum entrant becomes a license holder and primary user. The question that exclusive users must evaluate is whether they can gain an adequate return on the investment of the spectrum license.
Cooperative sharing means that spectrum entrants must first negotiate a spectrum usage agreement with a license holder. We differentiate this from an MVNO in that we assume here that the entrant provides their own infrastructure. The spectrum entrant becomes a secondary user and can provide service subject to the priorities of primary users. The service quality risk is somewhat higher because of that subordination; since it is a matter of contract, the quality depends more on the ability to enter into an agreement than it does on the execution of the agreement (assuming perfect remediation for contract breach). Moreover, sensing is not required in cooperative sharing. We assume also that the contract provides exclusivity for the cooperative secondary user. In bilateral negotiations, sharing can take on a number of forms (See [10] for an exposition on spectrum sharing negotiations in early US broadcast radio). For the sake of discussion, let us consider a few possibilities:
1. A contract that leases a spectrum band continuously over a longer investment horizon (i.e., months/years) for a subset of the license service area; 2. A contract that provides for defined periodic access (e.g., fixed hours or days) over the investment horizon for the entire license service area;
3. A contract that leases a subset of the spectrum for continuously over a longer investment horizon (i.e., months/years) for the entire license service area;
4. A contract that provides for defined periodic access (e.g., fixed hours or days) over the investment horizon for the entire license service area for a subset of the spectrum license Clearly, many additional variations are possible. The point in describing a few possibilities is that, in general, we can assume that the revenue is lower for cooperative secondary users than for exclusive users either because of the quality provided, the (average) duration of the access or the reach of the access. Furthermore, the QoS for cooperative sharing depends on the spectrum investment. We assume that spectrum cost increases with contract term. With higher cost, cooperative secondary users get better QoS.
Opportunistic sharing means that spectrum entrants must have the capability to sense primary users' activities so they can take advantage of idle spectrum slots. There are numerous types of spectrum holes and context acquisition approaches (see [2, 3] for a discussion and analysis). The service quality risk under this approach is higher than under cooperative sharing for two reasons: (1) the spectrum entrant relies on the probability that spectrum holes are available at a sufficient frequency and bandwidth [3, 8] and; (2) spectrum holes may need to be shared with other opportunistic users, so the throughput of those holes is uncertain. Thus, entrants must determine whether the spectrum hole density is sufficient (and in the right places) to warrant the investment in infrastructure and sensing that is necessary for this approach to work. While much is unknown about spectrum hole density, researchers (e.g. [8] ) have built some preliminary models using Markov and Semi-Markov chains. Considerably more work is needed in this arena to characterize and model real-world spectrum holes, since the characteristics of spectrum holes have a significant impact [3] . For the purposes of this paper, we are implicitly assuming stochastic, exogenous spectrum holes, though this analysis could apply easily to other kinds of exogenous spectrum holes as well.
Unlicensed use means that all spectrum users have equal access to the bands (primary non-cooperative sharing according to [9] ). Thus, the quality that any user can achieve depends on (1) the probability of other active unlicensed users at that time and (2) the characteristics of the MAC protocol in use. Thus, spectrum entrants who choose to operate in unlicensed bands are, in general, subject to greater interference from other unlicensed users. At the same time, the reach for each station is restricted because larger cells result in higher congestion. Therefore, they have to invest in many access points to cover a large area. The advantages of unlicensed use include (1) there is no cost for spectrum licenses, contracts or sensing required (though sensing may be required for "listen-before-talk" protocols) in this approach, so it may well be the cheapest; (2) in contrast to opportunistic or cooperative users, unlicensed users can work wherever and whenever they want. If they are lucky enough, they are the only user and operate as exclusive usage.
B. Investment
From the discussion above, it is clear that each spectrum choice that a spectrum entrant can make involves a different investment as well as a different return on that investment. The similarity is that each method incurs an upfront infrastructure cost, annual maintenance (IM) fee, and backhaul charge which can vary across methods.
In addition to these costs, primary users must pay the upfront spectrum license fee. Cooperative secondary users must pay a periodic spectrum leasing fee as long as they operate. Opportunistic sharing requires devices that detect spectrum holes. Methods that sense spectrum hole includes individual sensing, sensor networks, and database. To simplify the analysis, we assume that sensing will be performed by an external sensor network (following [11] ). (This frees us from having to estimate the number of users, as would be necessary in the cognitive radio case.) Except for sensing, opportunistic sharing requires equipment that can operate over a larger frequency range; therefore the radio cost is higher than above two choices. Unlicensed users have the least infrastructure cost per station because the equipment is heavily standardized and transmit power is limited.
C. Revenue
Specifically, we frame revenue as a function of the quality, duration and reach of the service 1 , and we assume that there is enough demand, so revenue only depends on the quality and net service provision. We will consider the impact of this assumption in section III-C. Here, we let the quality of service (QoS) of a wireless service depends on the absolute throughput as well as its variation. The duration of service is the amount of time a service is available over the study interval. Finally, the reach of the service is a combination of the overall coverage area as well as the population density of that area.
For our first order analysis, we use a simple multiplicative form of this function: 1 We ignore any strategic benefits for the purpose of this paper.
where 0,1 indicates the QoS variance (similar as jitter if the QoS is measured as delay). In this paper, we consider as contention rate.
1 means the contention rate is negligible. In a real system, contention increases costs for retransmission and requires a larger buffer to smooth the jitter. We only consider the impact from QoS variance on revenue in this paper.
0,1 represents the operation time, again with respect to a license holder.
0,1 specifies the coverage with 1 means the wireless service reaches the entire geographic area listed in the spectrum license. Finally, is a constant and represents the revenue per unit of service delivered. Since we are interested in comparing the decision of a spectrum entrant, we assume this is constant for all modes of spectrum access.
III. NET PRESENT VALUE ANALYSIS

A. Net Present Value for the Four Choices
In this section we use NPV to analyze the four spectrum choices. The NPV is an indicator of the valuation of each alternative. With a particular project, if the NPV is positive, the project brings net value to the firm. If the NPV is negative, the project subtracts value from the firm. If the NPV equals to zero, the project does not bring monetary value to the firm. The formula of calculating NPV is
where is the net cash flow at time , is the annual riskfree interest rate, is the total number of period.
B. NPV for Four Choices
Following the discussion in section II, the NPV calculation for exclusive usage is
where is the infrastructure cost for exclusive usage, is the spectrum license fee, is the annual revenue for exclusive usage, is the maintenance cost plus backhaul charge per year.
In the cooperative sharing model, we assume that suitable agreements can be negotiated with a probability , and that these agreements provide exclusive use for the spectrum entrant for the duration of the contract. That means, with probability , the cooperative secondary users can earn revenue, while with probability (1 ), cooperative secondary users incur irrecoverable costs, which includes maintenance costs and the cost of negotiation. Here, we only consider the maintenance cost for simplicity. The NPV calculation for cooperative sharing is
Where, is the infrastructure cost for cooperative sharing, is the annual revenue, is the spectrum leasing fee.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the spectrum hole in opportunistic sharing has sufficient bandwidth with a probability (0 1), where q is the probability that the spectrum hole is adequate after sharing it with the n users who are present. We further assume that they work in the TDMA mode and that the number of users is uniformly distributed ( ( ) ), thus ( ( ) · (1 ) ⁄ . (The calculation of transmission time also applies to unlicensed usage.) In short, opportunistic users only get revenue whenever the spectrum hole is available and s/he gets the chance to transmit without contention. When the spectrum hole is not available, they lose money on maintenance. The NPV of opportunistic sharing is thus computed as: ∑
where is the infrastructure cost for opportunistic sharing, is the annual revenue.
Without loss of generality, we assume that unlicensed users work under TDMA, and they get their desired QoS whenever they transmit without contention. In other words, whenever the unlicensed user transmits without contention they earn the full revenue. We calculate the NPV for unlicensed users as follows:
where is the infrastructure cost for unlicensed users and is the annual revenue.
C. Comparison
In this section we will compare the NPV among different spectrum choices, in order to provide a quantitative guidance on how to select the spectrum choice. Assuming constant dollar values for all time dependent cost variables simplifies the analysis because the summations are removed from the expressions above. Thus, the value for exclusive usage becomes · · ; the value for cooperative sharing is · ( ) (1 ) ( ); the value for opportunistic sharing is q · N( ) (1 ) · ( ) ; The value for unlicensed sharing is · · . We further assume that the maintenance costs are nearly the same for all spectrum choices.
1) Exclusive use versus other choices:
First, we compare exclusive use with cooperative sharing. We assume that the agreement is for a fraction of the license holder's electrospace, or · because 0,1 . We can conclude that a spectrum entrant would choose to purchase a license over cooperative sharing when
. In other words, when the average license cost is less than the spectrum leasing fee plus the difference in revenues due to exclusive use. In this case, the factor is due to the outcome of negotiations. In reality, we would expect to be a function of , so it can be influenced by the spectrum entrant. The upper bound for is · , where the spectrum leasing fee is equal to the license fee when they have the same electrospace, where C PU is the maximum spectrum leasing fee. Primary users will lease spectrum to secondary users as long as the spectrum leasing fee is larger than their loss due to not operating.
When we move to opportunistic sharing, a spectrum entrant would choose exclusive sharing when the average cost of a license is less than the difference in average infrastructure costs, less the difference in revenue, or
. It is important to note that the risks multiply especially when the spectrum entrant seeks to use stochastic spectrum holes. Each of the variables depends on outcomes not controlled by the spectrum entrant, so the irrecoverable costs are higher. That is, the spectrum entrant would have to make infrastructure investments on which returns (in the form of revenues) are uncertain.
Like opportunistic sharing, unlicensed users face uncertainty in the number of users in the same band over the same area. Spectrum users will chose exclusive use when ( ) . In other words, if the average spectrum licensing fee is less than the difference between annual net revenue of exclusive and unlicensed use, exclusive use is more profitable. The results of our analysis are due to the large number of access points needed and the necessity of providing backhaul to each. Costs can be reduced if fewer access points are needed, but this may run afoul of transmitting power standards in the band and will certainly increase the likelihood that competing users will exist, which drives down QoS. From those inequalities above, we can summarize several situations where exclusive usage is not preferred. First, in general, the inequalities largely depend on the average cost. Thus, short operation period leads to higher profit in other spectrum choices. Second, the spectrum leasing fee is largely depends on primary users' usage and market demand and supply. If the difference between spectrum leasing and licensing fee is large, cooperative sharing is preferred. Third, opportunistic sharing is preferred when the infrastructure cost is decreased with technology development, and the spectrum is idle.
2) Cooperative sharing and Opportunistic sharing: by using the constant-dollar simplifications above, we can conclude that when cooperative sharing is chosen when · · · . In other words, when the expected spectrum leasing fee is less than the difference between the expected revenue of cooperative and opportunistic sharing plus the difference in average infrastructure cost, cooperative sharing is more profitable.
is the common situation, since opportunistic sharing is prone to contention and has less transmission time. Moreover, with higher QoS, the unit revenue for cooperative sharing will be larger than the one for opportunistic sharing. In addition, in the above numeric result, we assume the maximum spectrum leasing fee. There are several situations that lead to opportunitic sharing as well. First, the spectrum market is not vivid, secondary users can hardly negotiate the spectrum contract. Second, infrastructure and maintenance cost for two sharing models are nearly the same while the spectrum is idle.
3) Unlicensed use versus sharing:
We start with the comparison between unlicensed use and cooperative sharing. Secondary users will choose cooperate sharing when · · . In words, when the expected spectrum licensing fee is less than the difference in annual revenue minus the difference in average infrastructure cost, cooperative sharing is preferred. In general, since cooperative sharing has better spectrum usage terms. The difference of average infrastructure cost depends on the service reach and base station radius. The successful spectrum contract negotiation rate is another essential factor here. If the spectrum supply is low or the spectrum leasing fee is too high, unlicensed usage if superior.
Opportunistic sharing does not have spectrum leasing fee, therefore, as long as · , opportunistic sharing is more profitable. From the calculation of revenue, we can conclude that if there are same number of active users in unlicensed and opportunistic sharing, unlicensed use is more profitable since it does not depend on the spectrum hole availability. If the active user in unlicensed band is significantly larger than the active user in opportunistic sharing, the latter one is preferred due to the longer transmission time and less contention rate, then higher unit revenue. Table I summarizes the situation where one spectrum choice is superior than other approaches. The first column is the dominating approach. This analysis helps spectrum users select spectrum choices by providing an upper bound for spectrum license fee and spectrum leasing fee. They can be easily transformed to the minimum required revenue for each method as well.
4) Summaries:
Two general parameters have a large influence on the spectrum choice-coverage and unit revenue. Coverage determines the infrastructure cost and the infrastructure cost increases with the size of the footprint due to the physical characteristics of electromagnetic waves. In general, varying the coverage (or reach) parameter does not alter that outcome.
The unit revenue reflects the demand from customer side. Spectrum users have less risk after they know the demand. Discussions above assume that the unit revenue remains the same. It should not be the case for sharing and unlicensed usage, since they have the ability to change service type and technologies. This will be further discussed in section IV managerial flexibility.
Performing sensitivity analysis on the unit revenue parameter poses challenges beyond the scope of this paper. We assumed that the revenue is linear with QoS for simplicity. However, in reality the revenue may be log normal with QoS. That is the revenue is very sensitive to QoS when it is relatively low. In addition, spectrum users may have different business and service models that also impact revenues. Finally, the license fee negotiated in the cooperative case will likely be dependent on the expected revenues, resulting in the need for a model that dynamically adapts. 
IV. MANAGERIAL FLEXIBILITY
Tangible cash-flow is only one aspect that a firm must consider. Another important aspect that does not show in the NPV calculated above managerial flexibility. Having the flexibility to deal with uncertainties has value. The real options approach has been used for investigating risks and flexibility in a way that is difficult to capture in NPV-based models [14] . The rationale for using real options is that investments always lead to uncertainties in the future. A real option gives the firm the right but not obligation to take a specific action in the future. Applying real options to the secondary user decision problem will be treated explicitly in a future paper, but we would like to point out some of the benefits of this approach here.
A. Risk and Benefit
According to [15] , a complete investment lifecycle can be divided into six stages. Every investment begins from inception stage, where investment is an implicit opportunity. At the recognition stage, the investment is deemed a practical opportunity. After making the investment decision, the project enters the building stage. The flag for operation stage is that the project starts having direct and measurable payoffs. In the retirement stage, indirect payoffs come from the vast investment in technological assets and its capabilities. When these assets and capabilities no longer produce payoffs, the investment reaches the obsolescence stage.
Although risks exist in the entire investment lifecycle, we only focus here on the three stages that involve a large investment and high risks. They are the recognition, building, and operation stages. At the recognition stage, companies gather information and make estimates about costs, benefits, and risks. In the building stage, companies make needed investments (e.g., transmitters, base stations, etc.) and establish networks. They also need to make their spectrum access decision in the building stage. They have four choices as illustrated in Section IIA. Different spectrum decisions in the building stages lead to different risks in the operations stage, where spectrum users start providing wireless services to customers and earn revenues based on the investment in infrastructure and spectrum.
Risks in these three stages fall into four generic categories. The first one is monetary risk is due to the uncertainty about the firm's ability to complete a project with long-term benefits. For simplicity, we do not consider demand for this paper. However, it is possible that spectrum users cannot cover their investments in infrastructure and spectrum if demand is weaker than anticipated.
The second risk is competition risk comes from the responses of other firms in the industry due to entry. For example, if we consider the spectrum access dimension, we see that incumbents do not face competition risks due to spectrum access, since their spectrum license is exclusive. Cooperative spectrum sharing only encounters competition when they lease spectrum from license holders. They do not compete with others after making the deal. Opportunistic spectrum sharing and spectrum users in unlicensed bands confront competition all the time and there is no guarantee of successful operation.
The third risk is environmental risk and considers two aspects. The first is the regulatory environment, which includes the FCC's regulations on spectrum assignment, allocation and use. For example, the FCC may open more unlicensed bands to stimulate innovation. It may also auction more spectrum licensees to boost competition. The second aspect is the market environment. Although spectrum may be traded in the private market [16] , it is still generally not considered a liquid market [7] . There is no guarantee that the transaction cost will be low or there will be enough cooperative spectrum sharing for secondary users.
The last risk category includes the technological risks that come mainly from possible changes in the spectrum environment. For example, the existing infrastructure and services may not be compatible with available frequency bands. The physical characteristics of electromagnetic waves determine the requirements of infrastructure and possible services. Interference brought by other wireless systems that transmit in adjacent bands and geographic areas is another major technological risk.
This risk list is by no means exhaustive. There are other risks such as (1) project risks which consider project scope and staff's ability to implement the project; (2) functionality risks which related to the project design; and (3) organizational risks which reflect firm's cooperation and adoption of the project.
B. Flexibility in spectrum utilization
Managers have several options for dealing with risk. It includes delay, switch, lease, and abandon options. In this section, we consider the impact of a few of these to illustrate the application of the real options approach to the secondary user decision. Defer is the ability to postpone the investment to learn more about the potential risks and outcomes of the project, and adjust to the varying situations. The defer option is available for all four choices in the recognition stage. Moreover, spectrum users can delay establishing infrastructure after they buy the spectrum license from the FCC. We assume that the maximum delay is 5 years and that other spectrum users do not have delay options in building stage to simplify the analysis.
In switch option, spectrum users have the flexibility to change spectrum choices, except for primary users. For example, if the cooperative spectrum user finds that the spectrum market is not liquid or the price for shared bands is too high, he can switch to opportunistic spectrum sharing by establishing sensing technology or unlicensed bands at no extra expense. Unlicensed users can switch to secondary usage if the resource competition drives the QoS to be unacceptable levels. However, primary users do not have the ability to switch. When the project payoff is too low, the resource (spectrum) can be leased. Only primary users can lease spectrum, since we assume that cooperative secondary users consume all shared bands they purchased.
The project will be abandoned if the payoff cannot cover the cost. The available assets are assigned to other projects until the original project resumes. A similar option is stopresume, which we do not consider here
C. Mapping risks and options in each case
As shown in Table II , if the company chooses to be a primary user in the building stage, they need to purchase a spectrum license. The most significant risks in the operation stage are monetary, so sub-leasing spectrum is a shadow option for these risks. All other spectrum choices lead to more risks (uncertainties) than are faced by primary users in operation stage. As required for the spectrum license, primary users must provide wireless services within 5 years of purchase. During these 5 years, they can lease spectrum to others. This action provides two benefits: they earn monetary compensation and they can better assess supply and demand and therefore avoid potential risks of losing money on novel services. Due to the large spectrum investment, switch is not a suitable option for exclusive usage. In sum, primary users can apply the lease and defer together to manage risks.
Cooperative users confront monetary risks that come from both infrastructure and spectrum. They also face potential competition from license holders when leasing spectrum as well as regulatory action; finally, spectrum markets highly affect cooperative secondary users. Technological risks are due to the uncertainty of spectrum supply. Cooperative secondary users may encounter challenges if the radios they invested in are designed for frequency bands that are not available 2 . The option for cooperative secondary users is switch, which means they can change their spectrum usage choice. For example, if they have enough capital to invest in a license when one is available and they have a profitable project, cooperative secondary users can become license holders (exclusive users) to manage regulation, technology and competition risks. If cooperative users want to switch to opportunistic sharing, they need to upgrade its radios to accommodate larger frequency bands and enable sensing ability. When cooperative users switch to the unlicensed band, they need to rebuild the entire base station network.
Opportunistic users face the same monetary risks as cooperative users, except for the potential high charge of spectrum leasing fee. At the same time, opportunistic sharing faces higher competition that comes from other active opportunistic users. This competition results in less transmission time and more interference. One unique risk for opportunistic users is the potential action from the regulatory body. It is possible that the regulatory agency does not allow opportunistic access to certain bands due to the QoS uncertainty. In this circumstance, opportunistic users cannot operate anymore. Switch is the main option that opportunistic users have. With advanced radio and sensing abilities, opportunistic users are easy to switch to any of other spectrum choices.
Unlicensed users have the most intense competition for access and the interference is unpredictable. Therefore, there is no guarantee of QoS. Unlicensed users can be seen as an explore option, since they have the least sunk cost and the most flexibility in spectrum choices. No matter which spectrum choice that unlicensed users want to switch to, they need to rebuild the entire network, which means the previous infrastructure cost is unreuseable. In real option analysis, each option has utility as well as monetary compensation. We will develop a utility calculation that includes both revenue and options in the future.
V. CASE STUDY AND DISCUSSION
A. Parameters:
Parameters that used in the numerical results are summarized in table III. Maintenance costs for all choices are 10% of the infrastructure costs. Full coverage is 3 10 m for all cases. Infrastructure and sensor network costs linearly decrease with coverage decrease. Backhaul cost for exclusive use and two sharing models are $150 per month per site, and it is $50 per month per site for unlicensed use. There are two cases in sharing and unlicensed usage. The first case is the high performance one, and the second case is the low performance scenario. Figure 2 illustrates the NPV for each of the 15 years of the project life for each scenario. Thus, it provides us with project NPV (in the 15 th year) as well as the breakeven point (when it crosses NPV = 0) using the assumptions described above. We see that exclusive use has the largest return in long-term, breaking even in the 8 th year. Cooperative sharing for high QoS has the second highest long-term NPV, though marginally so, being $0.3 million more than high QoS opportunistic sharing. It is important to reiterate here that the spectrum entrant cannot control whether a possible, especially in the opportunistic c depends on the uncertain availability of spe the uncertain number of other users using tho cooperative case, there is also uncertainty in can be, to some extent, influenced by the e endogenous [2] ) based on the leasing price s pay. Unlicensed service is never profita assumptions because of the high backhau consistent with other research studies [12, 13] More nuanced conclusions that might be d
B. Numerical results and discussion:
• The spectrum decision is time depe use gives the highest long-term gain. performance cooperative and opportu the 10 th year. Therefore spectrum user to provide wireless service for more t choose sharing model for higher profit
• Opportunity sharing provides few cooperative sharing under the sam Notice that, it does not mean that oppo is worse than cooperative sharing. T depends on spectrum environment market liquidity. Therefore, choosing requires spectrum users to understan environment.
• Each spectrum choice requires differe flow. Exclusive use needs a large u license fee which may be a burd Opportunistic sharing demands mo cost than cooperative sharing at the cooperative sharing requires annu spectrum leasing, while opportunistic h
In the above example, spectrum users original choice for the entire operation. It may In the second case study, spectrum users do view of the rate of return on wireless servic (which is a normal case Figure 3 , we show th option for cooperative users if they apply the same methodology to unlicensed use. From the figur performance opportunistic sharing the spectrum environment is not idl the opportunity to buy spectrum guarantee on high revenue, but the b from switching.
Under the same assumptions, o positive NPV at the end of 15 th yea All switch choices for unlicens revenue. If the spectrum envir spectrum licensed is not available, to drop the project, since all other c They may change to other services rent their infrastructure to other wir scope of this paper). Our case study is by no mea situations can happen. For exam liquidity and spectrum hole availab high or low. This change can em operation, so it is impossible to pro situation. Our decision based mo guideline for spectrum users to ad according to their operation and detail, spectrum users could provide expected return and operation ti according to their preference.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND F
This paper was a continuatio secondary users and secondary user simple decision model to examine spectrum entrant might make, and some very rough estimates of so revenue components. The key con provide a guideline for spectrum different spectrum choices. This gu g to our analysis, if the to other users, its long-term It is only $4,170,052 in the e NPV given by switching y switch in the 5 th year. We opportunistic sharing and re, it is clear that high is the dominate option. If e and the spectrum user has m license, it provides a break point is 8 years away only exclusive use provides ar in opportunistic sharing. sed use provide negative ronment is crowded and the best choice for them is choices give negative NPV. with higher unit revenue or reless providers (outside the haring with Switch Option ans comprehensive. Other mple, the spectrum market bility may change to either merge at any time of their ovide the solution to every odel (Table II) provides a dapt their spectrum choice existing environment. In e an NPV analysis based on me and select an option FUTURE RESEARCH on of our research into r behavior. We have built a the choices that a potential d have developed this with ome of the key cost and ntribution of this paper is to m users to choose from uideline considers monetary compensation as well as managerial flexibility. We use two case studies to show the return of each spectrum choice and the impact from the option. Given the numbers that we used, we see that spectrum decision is time dependent and the option that imbedded in each choice has a large impact.
Understanding and managing the risks faced by spectrum entrants has received little attention ([17] is one of the few examples). We plan on applying real options analysis to this problem to better understand and model the problem(s) faced by secondary users with the ultimate goal of supporting the adoption of DSA technologies in practice. Doing this in a realistic way requires that we first develop a more sophisticated decision model that is supported by better technical models. It is also necessary to better calibrate the cost and revenue estimates so that the outcomes are more closely aligned with current or projected reality. A more sophisticated analysis of the risks faced by a spectrum entrant will be addressed using real options. Finally, we plan on incorporating these models into a an agent-based computational economics model (similar to [1] ) to provide more sophisticated insight into the choice tradeoffs faced by secondary users.
